Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) guarantees the security of communication with quantum physics. Most of widely adopted QKD protocols currently encode the key information with binary signal format-qubit, such as the polarization states. Therefore the transmitted information efficiency of the quantum key is intrinsically upper bounded by 1 bit per photon. High dimensional quantum system is a potential candidate for increasing the capacity of single photon. However, due to the difficulty in manipulating and measuring high dimensional quantum systems, the experimental high dimensional QKD is still at its infancy. Here we propose a sort of practical high-speed high dimensional QKD using partial mutual unbiased basis (PMUB) of photon's orbital angular momentum (OAM). Different from the previous OAM encoding, the high dimensional Hilbert space we used is expanded by the OAM states with same mode order, which can be extended to considerably high dimensions and implemented under current state of the art. Because all the OAM states are in the same mode order, the coherence will be well kept after long-distance propagation, and the detection can be achieved by using passive linear optical elements with very high speed. We show that our protocol has high key generation rate and analyze the anti-noise ability under atmospheric turbulence. Furthermore, the security of our protocol based on PMUB is rigorously proved. Our protocol paves a brand new way for the application of photon's OAM in high dimensional QKD field, which can be a breakthrough for high efficiency quantum communications.
Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the best-known applications of quantum information, which promises in principle unconditional secure communications-the Holy Grail of communication security-based on the law of physics only [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . Owing to the quantum non-cloning theorem, QKD system makes it impossible for an eavesdropper to keep a transcript of quantum signals. For this reason, QKD is an essential element of the future quantum-safe infrastructure.
A typical QKD protocol involves two parties, conventionally called Alice and Bob, who aim to generate a secret key by exchanging quantum systems over an insecure communication channel [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . Security is assessed against the most powerful attack on the channel, where an eavesdropper, conventionally called Eve, perturbs the quantum systems using the most general strategies allowed by physical laws [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . In general, traditional QKD protocols are performed with qubits, which are two-level quantum systems. In these binary QKD systems, the information efficiency is limited to 1 bit per photon. However, the QKD protocol requires the efficiency of key transmission to be as high as possible. High transmission efficiency allows more data to be encrypted, and the anti-noise performance of quantum channel is improved with the increase of key transmission efficiency.
Over the last decades we have witnessed the advances of high-dimensional quantum cryptography. The use of high dimensional quantum systems allow for more information to be transmitted between the communicating parties. And the QKD protocols based on qudit encoding (unit of information in a d dimensional space) exhibit a higher resilience to noise, allowing for lower signal-to-noise ratio of the received signal, which in turn may be translated into higher transmission efficiency and longer transmission distance [21] [22] [23] [24] . As a result, high dimensional QKD (HDQKD) has great potential for developing [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] . Unfortunately, this potential of HDQKD has not been fully fulfilled so far. This is because HDQKD has a critical obstacle in efficient and fast-speed high dimensional quantum states generation and measurement.
As one of the potential choices for high dimensional quantum system, photon's orbital angular momentum (OAM) has a promising perspective [30] [31] [32] . On one hand, the OAM quantum number l can be any arbitrary integer, which corresponds to infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces [33] . On the other hand, OAM encoded quantum systems are arXiv:1801.06582v1 [quant-ph] 19 Jan 2018 suitable for communication over free-space link due to its resilience against perturbation effects caused by atmospheric turbulence. Up until now, a number of studies have investigated the benefits employing OAM modes in quantum cryptography [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] . However, the realization of existing OAM coding HDQKD protocols are still impractical so far mostly due to the difficulty in efficiently measuring single photons in the OAM basis. Because the bases of these protocols are just constructed by different order of OAM states, which will be totally decoherent for long-distance propagation. Furthermore, the repetition rate of the system lies at the range of KHz in all of the existing OAM coding HDQKD, casting serious doubts about their perspective for real world applications.
Here, we take a major step overcoming the above drawbacks and propose a sort of practical high-speed HDQKD protocol. In our protocol, the partial mutual unbiased basis (PMUB) using OAM states with same mode order is constructed for the first time. This important change leads to stable propagation and easy measurement for all the OAM states. The generation, manipulation and detection of the same mode order OAM states can be realized by passive linear optical elements. Thus the repetition rate of the system will theoretically reach to GHz. By using π/2 converter, the experimental complexity will not increase greatly with the rise of the dimension.
Results
Partial mutual unbiased basis. Laguerre-Gaussian (LG) mode beam is a typic one carrying OAM of photon. In this section we introduce expansion formulas for LG and Hermite-Gaussian (HG) modes, which is the foundation of establishing the PMUBs. At the single photon level, by using relation between Hermite and Laguerre polynomials, an LG state can be decomposed into a set of HG states of the same order [40] 
with real coefficients
where k is the wave number, N = n + m is the order of mode. The factor i k in Eq. (1) corresponds to a π/2 relative phase difference between successive components. Similarly, an HG state whose principal axes has been rotated 45
• can be decomposed into exactly the same constituent set
with the same real coefficients b(n, m, k) as above. Most of the QKD protocols are based on the concept of mutually unbiased basis (MUB). Because in a set of MUBs {B 0 , B 1 , B 2 , ....., B k , B n }, if a state prepared in B k basis is measured in B n basis (with k = n), all the outputs are equally probable. However when constructing MUBs in the OAM based HDQKD protocol, the coherence of superposition states between different orders OAM states will be destroyed after long-distance propagation, making it difficult to perform the practical secure key transmission.
In our protocol, the problem of decoherence in long-distance propagation is solved by constructing two PMUBs l nm (the LG basis) and h nm (the HG basis), which are given by
where N can be any positive odd number for the reason of extensibility of the protocol. The biggest advantage of the chosen two bases is that all the states are in the same mode order. Although l nm and h nm are not mutually unbiased, according to Eqs. (1)- (4), each individual photon state cannot be fully distinguished in every bases. So our protocol is still secure, the detailed and rigorous security proof for PMUB is shown in the Method section.
Four dimensional QKD protocol description. Based on the above analysis, the HDQKD protocol can be realized based on two PMUBs l nm and h nm for any positive odd number N . For simple and clear description for our HDQKD, here we consider the case of four dimensional QKD protocol with N = 3 as an example. Figure 1 shows the states for our protocol (HG and LG modes of order 3). Each time the state Alice chooses for key encoding is one of the eight states in the LG mode (denoted as |l i , i = 0 ∼ 3) and the HG mode (denoted as |h i , i = 0 ∼ 3).
FIG. 1: Examples of the decomposition of
LG (red) and HG (blue) modes of order 3.
Therefore, the four dimensional QKD protocol can be described as:
1. Alice generates two random bits a 1 , a 2 (all the random bits we mentioned are generated with uniform possibility distribution) as information to be encoded, and generates one random bit P A for basis choosing. Alice uses P A to determine the encoding basis: {|l i } or {|h i }, i = 0 ∼ 3, and uses a 1 , a 2 to decide which state |l(h) i to be sent. Then Alice sends the qudit state to Bob.
2. Bob generates one random bit P B to determine the measurement basis. Upon receiving the state, Bob measures the qudit state on {|l i } or {|h i } basis. From the measurement result, Bob receives two bit information
3. Alice and Bob do steps 1∼2 many rounds and keep a 1 , a 2 , d 1 , d 2 , P A , P B as raw data for later use. We denote
4. Sifting process: Alice and Bob announce and compare all the P A , P B data. They compare P A and P B , and throw all the corresponding raw data where P A = P B and keep the a, d with P A = P B as the raw key.
5. Alice and Bob perform standard post-processing method to generate secure and identical key.
Experiential approach. Figure 2 shows the principle experiment sketch of our four-dimensional QKD protocol. The LG state generators are used to prepare the original LG p l states with parameters l and p (the azimuthal index l is n − m and the radial index p equals to min[n, m]), and the main component is a spatial light modulator. An intensity modulator is used to generate decoy states. The decoy-state method [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] can be used to protect the transmission process from the photon number-splitting attack [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] . All the generators are controlled by acousticoptical modulators. In the state preparation and measurement part, the interferometric method in reference [41] is used to combine and sort the LG states. The Mach-Zehnder interferometers with two Dove prisms placed in each arm, and the relative angle between the Dove prisms is α/2. In the first and forth stages, α = π/4 corresponds to a relative phase difference ∆Ψ = lπ/4 between the two arms of the interferometers. Therefore, states with l = 8ω and l = 8ω + 4 come out in different ports, where ω is an integer. Similarly, in the second and third stages, α = π/2 corresponds to ∆Ψ = lπ/2, states with l = 4ω and l = 4ω + 2 come out in different ports. Spiral phase plates in each
at the beginning, the states entered in the transmission channel will be LG Security key rate based on numerical method. Typically, Alice's and Bob's shared density operater ρ AB is unknown to them. They gather data through local measurements and use the data to constrain the form of ρ AB . Following the methods in reference [53] , the measurements can be described by a set of bounded Hermitian operators Γ = {Γ i }. From their data, Alice and Bob determine the average value of each of the measurements,
which gives a set of experimental constraints,
and an additional constraint I = 1 is assumed to this set to enforce normalization. And according to [53] , key rate is given by the following maximization problem:
where where H(X|Y ) := H(ρ XY ) − H(ρ Y ) is the conditional Von Neumann entropy, with H(σ) := −T r(σ log 2 σ), M L (A) is the measurement on basis {|l ( ) i } (the basis of the equivalent entanglement-based protocol, see details in the method part),
and
In Eqs. (8) and (9), the optimization is over all vectors λ = {λ i }, where λ i are arbitrary real numbers, λ and Γ have equal cardinality. In the PMUBs case, the corresponding constraints are given by
where θ = max{arccos l i |h i }, M L and M H are the measurements on basis {|l i } and {|h i }. The biggest advantage of this numerical method is that the number of parameters one is optimizing over just equal to the number of constraints (in this case is 5), which is independent of dimension. Figure 3 plots the key rate of our four dimensional QKD and BB84 protocols as a function of the error rate Q, which show the fact that the variations in θ have essentially no effect on the key rate in the case of our protocol and shows it has better error tolerance. Practical key rate based on turbulence model. For the LG channel, after approximating the cumulative effect of the turbulence over the propagation path as a pure phase perturbation on the beam at the output plane z, the conditional probability of obtaining a measurement of the OAM of a photon l z = l is given by
where Θ(r, ∆l) is the circular harmonic transform of the rotational coherence function, which is given by Θ(r, ∆l) = 1 2π
where C φ (r, ∆θ) is the rotational coherence function of the phase perturbations at radius r. For Kolmogorov turbulence phase statistics, the rotational coherence function at radius r is where r 0 is the Fried parameter [54] . The OAM probabilities for various LG states propagating through Kolmogorov turbulence can be evaluated using Eqs. (11)- (13) . For different order state modes, the effect of the phase perturbations depends on the radial power distribution in the beam which for an LG p l is
giving a characteristic relative mean-squared beam radius r p,l = b √ 2p + l + 1. For the HG channel, during the measurement process, the HG states are converted to corresponding LG states by using the π/2 converter. What's more, in the above analysis, the cumulative effect of the turbulence over the propagation path is considered as a pure phase perturbation exp(iφ) on the beam at the output plane z. Therefore, the bit error rate can be calculated in the same way above. Figure 4 plots the probabilities for obtaining the original OAM eigenvalue scaled against the relative mean-squared beam radius for the LG , this probability is evaluated as p(l = l 0 ) = 0.88 ± 0.051. Regarding the average bit error rate Q as a statistical average composed of the bit error rate in LG and HG channel, the bit error rate is obtained as Q ≥ 0.12 ± 0.051. The statistical errors of p(l = l 0 ) and Q come from different chooses of (n, m). Figure 5 plots the simulation results that the practical security key rate K P as a function of time of our four dimenional QKD (blue line) and polarization coding reference-frame-independent QKD (red line) which has been experimental demonstrated to be robust for slowing varying reference frames [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] . For the reference-frame-independent QKD protocol, the noise parameter and the sampling interval are seted as 0.5s and π according to the result of [61] . It is easy to notice that the statistical errors of the two protocol are close, which highlights that our protocol has anti-noise ability.
Discussion
In summary, we have proposed a sort of high dimensional QKD protocol for practical application. In theory, we use PMUBs to overcome states transmission and measurement issues so as to improve the security key rate. For experimental realization, a detailed approach just using passive devices is designed, in which the state generation mainly depends on acoustic-optical modulators, resulting in a repetition rate at the range of GHz which is comparable with phase encoding protocol. Moreover, our protocol has extensibility, which means one can use higher dimensional states for key encoding. In view of its good security and reasonable implementation, we believe that our protocol will be a big step forward for high information efficiency quantum communication. Method Security analysis based on uncertainty relationship. Suppose there are two Hermitian operators X and Z on the L-dimension Hilbert space H, the corresponding orthonormal basis groups are {|x i }, {|z i } (i = 1 ∼ L). For an arbitrary state ρ ∈ H, the project-value measurement results on two orthonormal basis are denoted as: {p
Denote the Shannon entropy of measurement results as: H X (ρ), H Z (ρ). From the work [62] [63] [64] and [65] , the entropy uncertainty relationship is given by
where c is defined as the maximum overlap of two basis
and q M U = log( 1 c ). For the two orthonormal basis {|l i }(i = 0 ∼ 3) or {|h i }(i = 0 ∼ 3), the maximum overlap is given by c = max i,j c i,j = 3 8 , therefore q M U = log( 1 c ) = 3 − log 3. Hence the entropic uncertainty relationship for {|l i }, {|h i } is given by
For the security analysis, a tripartite uncertainty relations is often needed. In a tripartite scenario (as shown in Fig.6 ), state ρ ABE is divided into three parts A, B, E and sent to Alice, Bob and Eve, respectively. Suppose the subsystem held by Alice is ρ A , and there are two complementary measurement bases (X and Z) for ρ A . Alice perform measurement on either X or Z basis. If Alice measures X, then Bob's goal is to minimize his uncertainty on X measurement result H(X A |B); if she measures Z, then Eve's goal is to minimize his uncertainty on Z measurement result H(Z A |E). In this case, Bob and Eve hold quantum systems ρ B , ρ E , making them able to choose proper measurement basis to optimize their knowledge on Alice's measurement, thus Von Neumann entropy here is a lower bound over all the possible measurements on ρ B or ρ E . Renes et,al. [66] shows that there exists uncertainty relationship on H(X A |B), H(Z A |E) We take Devetak-Winter's approach [67] for security analysis, which is based on the entanglement distillation of a entanglement-based QKD protocol. For our BB84-like protocol, a equivalent entanglement-based protocol can be easily defined. Two protocols are equivalent with respect to Eve if and only if: 
which is defined on Hilbert space H A ⊗ H. The qudit on space H A is the ancillary bit kept by Alice which is used to determine the encoded information. Basis {|l i A } and {|h i A } are two orthonormal basis on H A which promise eq. (19) holds. Denote L = {|l 0 , |l 1 , |l 2 , |l 3 } T , H = {|h 0 , |h 1 , |h 2 , |h 3 } T . From Eq. (19) we can obtain
Alice then randomly choose to measure her ancillary qudit on H A in basis {|l i A } or {|h i A } based on the random number P A she generates. She keeps her measurement result as raw data a and sends the qudit in space H to Bob. Bob performs the same measurement as described in the real protocol. It's easy to show that this entanglement-based protocol is equivalent to the real one with respect to Eve. So asymptotic key rate K a for the entanglement-based protocol can be given by the Devatak-Winter formula [67] 
and 
where q M U defined in Eq. 15 can be calculated by the basis transform matrix U LH . According to Eq. (21) and Eq. (24), we can obtain
